Over the prior 10 years, the total value of North American PE transactions grew more than threefold from its low point during the Great Recession, and deal counts held steady at more than 12,000 per year. In addition, the level of uninvested capital (“dry powder”) reached record levels of near $2 trillion USD globally, a sizable savings account that reflected a growing investor appetite for excess returns from PE portfolios.
In effect, PE had raised more money than it could invest in new portfolio companies, and the performance of existing funds continued to attract new capital. A “PE bubble”—from overpaying for a reduced supply of target companies—seemed to be the main possible storyline on the horizon.
Of course, all storylines were rewritten with the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic. In just a few months, the tides turned dramatically, and PE ownership became a potential burden for companies seeking stimulus funds, deal volumes were greatly reduced, and some PE firms abandoned high-profile target companies. To compound these developing challenges, many PE managers lacked the freedom to target distressed companies and “buy low” due to portfolio risk limits and fewer acquisition targets.